Energy supply, distribution of energy, transmitting energy, energy transmission, high voltage supply concept photo

Executive Summary

As part of the ERO Enterprise, ReliabilityFirst (RF) assesses risk to support the continued reliability, security, and resilience of the Bulk Power System (BPS). This Regional Risk Assessment (RRA) integrates data driven analysis and stakeholder feedback to identify and prioritize risks affecting BPS reliability across the RF footprint. The RRA complements risk identification efforts conducted across the ERO Enterprise and informs RF’s planning and operational focus. The results of the RRA align with the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) Reliability Risk Priorities Report, which identifies ERO-wide risk profiles and themes.

The 2026 RRA identified seven risks that directly impact the RF region:

Main conclusions are as follows:

  • Environmental Factors are a constant threat to BES reliability in the RF region. Winter Storm Fern tested the region’s grid resiliency and highlighted its reliance on natural gas during peak demand periods. While standards revisions have addressed winterization, reliability margins are shrinking and catastrophic weather events are pushing the region to the edges of reliability.
  • Grid Transformation presents a multi-faceted, complex challenge to a changing grid that requires attention to ensure resource adequacy goals are met. While the region experiences rapid load growth primarily driven by data centers, the RF region has struggled to keep pace in adding new generation resources. This is due to a multitude of factors such as supply chain, financing, permitting, and siting issues. The integration of IBRs brings generation sources onto the system with unique characteristics, including their load profiles and other factors (e.g., ramping, oscillations, stability, and ride-through).
  • Security risks are increasing and evolving as actions are taken to address internal network security monitoring, cloud computing, and virtualization. RF’s compliance monitoring engagements continue to discover security vulnerabilities that must be mitigated to protect the region’s critical infrastructure. Geo-political tensions and domestic terrorism concerns require continuous vigilance.

Inputs to RF’s 2025-26 Regional Risk Assessment include 2024-2025 compliance monitoring and enforcement program data, regional xADS data, event data, as well as analysis from the NERC 2025 State of Reliability Report. In June 2026, NERC published its most current version this report, the 2026 State of Reliability Report. Key findings from the 2026 State of Reliability Report align with and reinforce the risks identified in this assessment:

  1. The grid remains reliable, but it is becoming more challenging to plan and operate. NERC's 2026 State of Reliability Report and RF's Regional Risk Assessment both conclude that rapid grid transformation is increasing operational complexity. Rising large computational load demand and the change of generation resources are creating new challenges for reliability planning and real-time operations.
  2. Resource adequacy and generator performance are continuing concerns. Both reports highlight shrinking reliability margins, increasing demands on the generation fleet, and elevated outage performance among conventional resources. Generation outages from combustion-based resources, as measured by the Weighted Equivalent Forced Outage Rate (WEFOR), remained above historical norms. In 2025, conventional generation performance within the RF footprint declined, driven largely by prolonged, one-time outages at five generating units that experienced major equipment failures, including turbine damage. While these events were isolated rather than fleet-wide, they highlight the importance of generator availability and performance during periods of extreme heat and cold.
  3. Extreme weather is increasing reliability risks across the RF footprint. While NERC's 2026 State of Reliability Report found that overall Energy Emergency Alert (EEA) activity declined across North America, RF continues to observe increasing reliance on EEAs and other emergency operating measures within PJM and MISO, reflecting a tighter operating environment during periods of peak demand and system stress. Although reliability was maintained without EEA-3 firm load shedding in 2025, events such as the Baltimore EEA-2 event demonstrate how extreme weather, grid transformation, and equipment failures can place additional pressure on grid operations.
  4. Large load integration remains a reliability concern. NERC’s report recognized the challenges posed by large load integration and called for collaboration between the electric industry and large load owners/operators. NERC is currently pursuing registration and new standards for large loads through the NERC Large Load Working Group, which RF participates in.

The risks discussed in this RRA will continue to evolve in our rapidly changing energy landscape and must be monitored and managed by registered entities in the RF footprint to ensure the reliable function of the BPS.

RF, through its compliance monitoring, enforcement, and outreach activities, as well as participation in various subcommittees, will continue to play a key role in ensuring effective regulatory oversight and informing its stakeholders about the key trends and developments identified in this report.

Addressing these issues requires a large effort that demands ongoing vigilance. Each registered entity is responsible for assessing its own risk in real-time and implementing solutions to further strengthen its risk posture. Our region benefits from a shared commitment to excellence in reliable and resilient grid operations. RF will remain a trusted partner in helping its stakeholders find new opportunities to address the challenges of an evolving grid.  

Risk Categories

Click each risk below to read its full profile.

Snow covered power plant

Phenomena that occur naturally, such as extreme weather and vegetation-related issues. Focuses on weather impacting resource and transmission availability.

renewable energy graphic

Federal and state policies are influencing resource and demand growth. Contains details about resource retirements, growth of inverter-based resources, and significant growth in computational loads (i.e., large loads or data centers).

Cyber: The protection of systems, networks, programs, and data that are related to the electronic access, monitoring, and control of the electric grid.
Physical: The protection of assets like substations, transformers, generating facilities, and control centers from threats that may compromise the unintended operation or purpose of those assets.

Shipping boat with globe supply chain concept

Covers the procurement of vendors and goods to ensure risks are mitigated and to avoid the compromise, delay, or unavailability of equipment, tools, and resources.

Electrical engineer inspecting control cabinet and relay wiring inside high voltage substation for system reliability, safety compliance, and power grid maintenance.

The failure of a protection system to operate as intended, resulting in the exacerbation of unplanned transmission outages that are not being actively monitored or planned.

Team of engineers in office collaborate on planning

Having sufficient representation of transmission and generation elements to model the electric grid and perform analysis that supports situational awareness and system planning.

Engineer Using SCADA System To Monitor Turbine

Risks related to information being unavailable (e.g. unexpected outages of tools, or planned outages without appropriate coordination or oversight) leaves system operators without visibility into some or all of the systems they operate.

Risk Ranking
Heat Map

Risk Rankings

  • Environmental Factors: High
  • Grid Transformation: High
  • Security: High
  • Supply Chain: Medium-High
  • Misoperations: Medium-High
  • Modeling: Medium-High
  • Situational Awareness: Medium

Risk Theme Components

Shared themes across the seven risk categories include human performance, policy, resilience, and data. RF considers these risk theme components while assessing risks, offering a more comprehensive view of their influence and potential mitigation strategies.

Engineer inspecting substation equipment

Human Performance

US Capitol Building

Energy Policy

transmission lines with sunset in the background

Resilience

data analysis

Data

Before: 3.2 hectares of industrial land.

Before: 3.2 hectares of industrial land.

Human Performance

Human Performance is primarily concerned with the challenges related to hiring and retaining a skilled workforce to ensure reliability and security objectives are met. Across the RF footprint, workforce shortages, retirements, inadequate training, and limited availability of specialized technical personnel are emerging concerns affecting multiple risk categories. These workforce gaps are especially significant in technically specialized roles in transmission planning, system operations, protection engineering, cyber security, and equipment manufacturing, where the loss of experienced personnel can increase the likelihood of human error and lead to process and operational failures.

NERC TADS data indicates that human performance-related outages were the second-largest cause of transmission outages in 2020-2025, although these outages have exhibited a downward trend. NERC GADS data indicates that human performance-related outages were a relatively small share of total generation outages since 2020. Figure 20 shows that operator error was the leading human performance-related outage cause between 2020 and 2025, and the number of these outages trended downward over time.

Figure 20. Human Performance-related Generation Outages in RF Footprint (2020-2025)

Figure 20. Human Performance-related Generation Outages in RF Footprint (2020-2025)

Figure 20. Human Performance-related Generation Outages in RF Footprint (2020-2025)

Similarly, while 39% of all misoperations in the RF footprint from 2020 to 2024 were connected to human performance issues, the number of human performance-related misoperations declined by almost 70% over the last four years, indicating substantial improvement.

Workforce constraints in the cyber security sector remain a significant concern, with RF’s 2024 CIP Themes and Lessons Learned Report identifying workforce and succession planning as a top theme. According to the report, cyber security staffing gaps increased 12.6% year over year. In relation to supply chains, according to CADDi’s 2025 Manufacturing Outlook Study, 79% of manufacturers identified skilled labor shortages as their biggest external challenge, reinforcing the relationship between workforce availability, manufacturing capacity, and prolonged equipment lead times.

Effective mitigation of this risk requires continued emphasis on structured onboarding, mentoring, role-specific training, succession planning, knowledge transfer, and cross-department flexibility. RF uses technical committees, outreach forums, Tech Talks, and collaboration with industry groups to share lessons learned and best practices around workforce development. Based on feedback from the Reliability Committee, RF is launching a Planning Workshop with beginner and advanced level training topics for transmission planning engineers. RF has also worked with the Transmission Performance Subcommittee to coordinate training for power-flow software and Python.

Engineer inspecting substation equipment, image

Energy Policy

Policy at the federal, state, and local level may directly or indirectly impact the reliability of the Bulk Power System. Policy includes FERC Orders and NERC Reliability Standards that govern the reliability and security of the BPS.

In the context of grid transformation, state and federal policy continue to reshape the resource mix. As PJM and MISO both project significant growth in summer and winter peak demand over the next decade, resource additions must consider state-level clean energy mandates. At the same time, recently enacted federal legislation and executive actions are deferring conventional generation retirements.

Enhancements to NERC Reliability Standards are helping to mitigate reliability risks. For example, NERC standards revisions (e.g., EOP-012-3, EOP-011-4, TPL-008-1, and TOP-002-5) directly address cold weather preparedness and operations, a material issue given Winter Storm Elliott’s 90.5 GW of coincident unplanned outages. In the cyber security arena, NERC Reliability Standard revisions and FERC Order No. 912 are helping to mitigate risks associated with third-party access, cloud and shared cyber infrastructure, and supply chain vulnerabilities.

Other policies shaping the energy landscape include those addressing inverter-based resources and large loads. For example, FERC Order No. 901 has initiated changes to the NERC Reliability Standards regarding modeling, ride-through capability, and interconnection studies associated with inverter-based resources. Regarding the risk posed by large loads, FERC has issued orders for the electric industry to develop efficient transmission service application and study procedures, as well as prevent cost-shifting.

RF continuously reviews federal and state regulatory policies and engages with policymakers and industry stakeholders to serve as an independent technical resource on BPS reliability. RF’s outreach and support efforts are committed to the advancement of timely, efficient, and sustainable solutions to enhance grid reliability and security.

US Capitol Building, image

Before: 3.2 hectares of industrial land.

Before: 3.2 hectares of industrial land.

Resilience

Resilience pertains to the ability to anticipate, adapt to, minimize the impact of, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.

Transmission outage metrics generally indicate strong resilience in the RF footprint, with outage frequency and severity trending downward. However, RF has recently observed an increase in outage duration for transmission lines and transformers, with most outages caused by equipment failures. Historically, transmission outages associated with equipment failures at substations are longer in duration than other causes, mainly due to the time necessary to obtain the proper safety clearances to perform repairs. Additionally, generation resource vulnerability exists within the RF footprint for natural gas resources that historically exhibit greater scarcity issues in winter.

RF is continually enhancing its Threat Intelligence program to strengthen overall situational awareness and resilience across the RF footprint. Implementing new tools and communication methods has enabled RF to monitor and assess individual events and communicate notable trends and observations to internal and external stakeholders. This helps to bolster situational awareness of emerging or imminent cyber, physical, and operational threats among various stakeholder groups. During Winter Storm Fern, this process was used to gather emergent weather and news information, collaborate with industry stakeholders, and provide updates to RF’s broader audience.

transmission lines with sunset in the background, image

Data

Data availability and quality, as well as the maturity of metrics and analytics that are used to assess grid performance are all vital to the successful operation and regulation of the BPS.

Since data is integral to achieving desired operational outcomes and planning for anticipated changes in response to grid transformation, RF uses a broad and evolving set of data sources to strengthen its understanding of reliability and security risks across the BPS. These sources include RF violation intake, generation and transmission outage data (GADS and TADS), renewable generation performance data, weather and operational information, misoperation event data (MIDAS), and external indicators related to cyber security threats. As grid threats evolve, integrating data from distributed energy resources, inverter-based resources, PMUs (phasor measurement units), and computational loads will remain vital to maintaining effective situational awareness.

Data availability and quality have direct implications on how risks are identified, measured, and mitigated. RF collaborates with the ERO Enterprise and industry stakeholders on data collection efforts, data processing initiatives, and other data-related activities that are intended to enhance transparency, improve decision-making, and promote reliability.

data analysis, image

About RF

RF is one of six regional organizations responsible for ensuring the reliability and security of the North American Bulk Electric System (BES). Under the authority of the North American Reliability Electric Corporation (NERC) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), we engage in compliance monitoring activities of mandatory NERC standards related to cyber security, operations, and planning.

We work together with NERC and the five other regions (MRO, NPCC, SERC, Texas RE, and WECC), collectively called the ERO Enterprise, in a shared mission. This system was born out of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which followed the 2003 Northeast Blackout.

Our region is situated within the Eastern Interconnection, and we are responsible for the reliability, security, and resilience of the BES in 13 states and the District of Columbia.

We also promote the reliability and security of the electric grid through outreach and training. We conduct our own analysis and projections related to resource planning and more. Based on our expertise and regional perspective, we are often sought as an independent source for reliability and energy policy decisions.

Our footprint includes:

13
States & Washington, D.C.

89 Million
Estimated Population

380+
Registered Entities

2,897
Generating Units

181 GW (Summer)
Forecasted Peak Load for 2026

199 GW
2026 Generation Capacity (Existing-Certain and Tier 1/ Planned)

>66,000
BES Line Miles

6,103
BES Lines and Transformers